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Mobile device security presents a unique challenge in the realm of cyber security, one
which is diffcult to assess and ultimately defend. Mobile devices, like other computing devices, should possess a secure environment by which a mobile user may operate safely and
securely. However, insecure coding when developing applications, incomplete assessment
tools to determine platform/application security, and security shortcomings in the Android
platform and mobile communications standards result in an insecure environment. This
thesis presents an analysis of aspects of a Mobile Station to identify components that contribute to the attack surface. An investigation is conducted to highlight vulnerabilities at
the Application, Communications, and Resource Layers. The thesis also identifes current efforts to assess and identify mobile vulnerabilities and weaknesses in application and
system settings. Finally, an automated vulnerability assessment solution is developed and
introduced in this thesis that can aid in combating potential threats to mobile security.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

With the advancement of technology and the integration of mobile devices into otherwise secured networks, it becomes crucial to address and resolve security concerns associated with this new and vulnerable addition. While incorporating these devices into
government, business, and industrial networks allows more ubiquitous access and ease-ofuse, it demands that all aspects of smart phone technology be scrutinized to ensure security
is maintained.

1.1

The Android Platform
The Android Operating System (OS) architecture is a complex union of complementary

open source and proprietary components. While the device is designed to be user-friendly
and somewhat easy to customize, the underlying core of the Android Operating System
is quite complex is and is comprised of many many layers that build and interface with
one another in a variety of ways. This Operating System model makes for a broad area
of components to examine when determining the overall security of and Android device.
Figure 1.1 demonstrates a rough layout of what makes up the Android Operating System.
At its core, the Android OS operates on a Linux kernel platform. The kernel handles much of the low-level support for the device, interfacing with hardware, handling
1

fle-system access, establishing and maintaining network connections, and managing active processes. Originally, the Linux kernel was a customized 2.6.x series build, but it has
grown and evolved over time and the advancement in technology and may possess up to
a 3.3.x build of a Linux kernel. These custom builds of Linux kernels were specifcally
designed for Android devices and possess unique qualities that separate them from traditional Linux builds used on desktop computers. Some key features of Android-specifc
Linux builds that pertain to security include the “Binder” and “Paranoid Networking” components. The Binder feature is used to control Inter-Process Communication (IPC) between
active processes on the device that wish to share resources but still adhere to a level of security and moderate process isolation. The Paranoid Networking component also ensures
a level of security to network sockets, offering permissions-based access restrictions [22].
Upon this Linux platform sits a register-based, Java-implemented Virtual Machine
(VM) known as the Dalvik VM. This Virtual Machine is connected to the Linux kernel
by shared native libraries, daemons, and a hardware abstraction layer used to allow for a
fully-integrated virtualized environment by which applications may run. The Dalvik VM
is implemented in a unique bytecode format and responsible for converting applications
that are written in Java code into a separate format to interface with the lower levels of the
device in a fle format known as the Dalvik Executable or “.dex” format. These executable
fles may be packaged inside Java system libraries or “JAR” fles or inside of Androidspecifc applications known as “APK” fles. As an added note, the experimental successor
to Dalvik VM is the Android Runtime (ART) Virtual Machine and continues to support
Dalvik executable fles [22].
2

Between the Dalvik VM and the application layer where user-installed and system
applications run, exists a layer of Android Framework Libraries and Core Java Runtime
Libraries. Applications use these libraries to interface with the underlying virtual machine. Within this space, applications are granted select locations in virtual memory to run
services and processes identifable by Proccess ID (PID) and Globally Unique Identifers
(GUID). To reduce the memory footprint of an individual application, a partially-initiated
process known as a Zygote may be generated to handle the Java bytecode of the application. [22].
Android application distribution and installation are associated with what are known
as Android Package (APK) fles and are governed by a core service known as a Package
Manager. Similarly, all application activity is handled by a service known as the Activity
Service Manager while application interaction using IPCs are maintained by applicationspecifc services known as Content Providers. In the original base Android construct, applications exist in a sandboxed environment and only interact with one another via local
Unix sockets or IPCs. However, the inclusion of Binder mentioned later in this chapter
allows for more centralized control and security of communications between applications.
All applications reside on the mobile device and are authorized access to various levels of the fle system and underlying core functions, hardware, communications channels,
and other applications through the use of permissions. These permissions are granted at
installation, are stored at multiple locations such as “packages.xml” and “AndroidManifest.xml”, are maintained by the package manager, and ultimately dictate the privileges
allotted to an individual application. This includes to what extent the device may interact
3

with system and other third-party applications as well. These permissions are enforced on
various levels of the Android OS where higher-level services query the package manager
to confrm specifc permissions assigned to an application while lower-level entities such
as native daemons look at the User Identifer (UID), the Group Identifer(GID) or some
equivalent to determine whether access to system resources may be granted. Lower-level
items an application may need to access include network and local sockets as well as access
to aspects of the fle system. It should be stated that traditional builds of Linux on Android
platforms use Discretionary Access Control (DAC) which puts sole reliance on UIDs and
GIDs to grant access. Later iterations of Android may include the use of a supplementary
component to the Linux kernel known as Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) which enforces Mandatory Access Control (MAC), application security and permission limitations
via a component known as Binder, and user application and core system daemon security
domain isolation. The MAC feature specifcally allows for the various security additions to
the standard Android model including the employment of proper security practice enforcement and authorization rules in what’s known as a “policy”. This policy must be updated
frequently to address new threats and may be set in different modes of operation. Similarly, Binder incorporates security from an application standpoint by handling application
IPC channels with more security-conscious execution, parameter marshalling, type enforcement, and kernel-level, process-specifc priviledge enforcement preventing priviledge
escalation [22].
Applications do not rely only on permissions granted at installation but also upon what
are known as pending intents established within the core functions of an application. These
4

intents are traditionally used to start and stop applications or services as well as provide
notifcations and raise alarms when events occur. Intent actions are typically limited by
the authorization and permissions granted to the generated application. Pending intents are
governed by the Activity Manager Service [22].

1.2

Security Aspects of Wireless Mobile Communications
In the paper [43], aspects of a mobile device are broken into three distinct layers to

distinguish where vulnerabilities may reside on a device: application layer, communication
layer, and resource layer. These layers help to distinguish vulnerabilities found within
individual system or user-installed applications from other issues such as a breakdown in
a wireless communications protocol. When examining each of these layers, it may be seen
how exploitation of a weakness in any one of these layers may result in the compromise
of the entire device. Figure 1.2 below demonstrates how one or multiple vulnerabilities in
any of these three layers may be exploited to allow a malicious actor to gain access.

1.2.1 Application Layer
1.2.1.1 General Application Vulnerabilities
The paper [43], outlines application layer threats or attacks as ones utilizing social
networking software, email services and applications, text messaging services, and synchronization software. Below, Figure 1.2 provides for a representation of both the layered construct of a Mobile Station (MS) and a potential attack avenue and communication
channel for malicious activity [43]. Another paper [29] takes a closer look at application
vulnerabilities, focusing on the inherent trust given by the user in the operation of the ap5

plication. In most mobile environments, such as Android which utilizes C, C++, and Java
libraries residing on top of a Linux kernel, a sandbox environment is presented, allowing
applications to run independently of one another with little likelihood of an application
directly affecting or controlling another consecutively-run program. This would seem to
allow for greater security for the user. However, because most applications on the Android
Marketplace are free or can be purchased for a low fee and are not extensively vetted or
required to undergo stress-testing to ensure maintenance of a sound security baseline, the
downloading user’s Mobile Station (MS) is susceptible to malware or a compromise in security. Many applications, by design or otherwise, may be granted excessive permissions
or access to embedded browser functionality such as with WebView, a capability using an
Android SDK library known as WebKit meant for ease of use and operations, but one that
may also be exploited by attackers to crash user applications and execute malicious code
[43] [18]. Though the inclusion of WebView in third-party applications is enabled for purposes such as email or chat client services and to load legitimate messages via HTTP, the
capability may be exploited by a malicious actor as an avenue to pass malicious payloads or
remote commands. It is also a potential vulnerability to JavaScript injection and attribute
misconfguration [18]. Greater risks also exist for those who have rooted their phones,
since this not only voids most service providers’ warranties and support agreements but
also grants the user (and inherently most applications residing on the device) root access,
authority that would allow malicious attackers easy access to the entire fle system [33].
Text-messaging services such as SMS and MMS require particular attention as they not
only possess the potential for direct exploitation in spamming or denial of service (DoS)
6

attacks [43], but they may also be utilized as a Command and Control (C2) channel for use
as a botnet [29].

1.2.1.2

Mobile Operating Systems

Android OS

Mobile Operating Systems, such as the Android Operating System, tend to

possess a series of security mechanisms by which vulnerabilities within the system may
be kept to a minimum [36]. Examining the architecture of applications in Android-specifc
Mobile Operating Systems, it can be seen that privilege separation is traditionally maintained using unique user IDs (UID) and group IDs (GID) [27]. While this would suggest
an element of sandboxing amongst applications, some confguration settings may be adjusted, namely using the sharedUserID feature, to allow multiple processes to have the
same User ID [36]. In addition, fle access may be exploitable if third party applications
do not properly limit user, group, and external user fle access permissions. Furthermore,
android-specifc permission settings are maintained in a SQLite database, where control
is granted by the system via the AndroidManifest.xml fle and with the use of one of
over 200 developer-controlled permission settings (i.e. android.permission.INTERNET).
Poorly written programs may allow excessive permissions to applications posing a potential risk to the mobile device [27]. Additionally, applications found on the Android Google
Play Store are not tested, nor are they required to possess a certifcate signed by the individual application. In not utilizing a certifcation authority (CA), authentication of the
author and nonrepudiation are not ensured [28].

7

Apple IOS Similar to Android architecture, the Apple mobile operating system, iOS,
resides upon a Unix-based construct similar to the Linux kernel found on Android mobile
devices. However, implementation and control of applications are maintained by a strict
hierarchical structure and written using Xcode as well as the iOS SDK. Applications also
run in a sandboxed environment on the operating system isolated from one another; however, all applications are more strictly vetted at Apple headquarters and stress-tested for
the proper implementation of secure coding practices prior to being released in the App
Store. Unlike Android, Apple iOS applications are signed not by a series of third party
developers, but by Apple itself as part of a code-signing requirement. An exception to
enterprise-signed applications may be allowed, but special confguration settings must be
enabled to allow aforementioned applications to be downloaded. As applications are run
in a sandboxed environment at a lower-level, that is closer to the kernel level, any harm
due to a compromise of the application layer is less than in Android applications [31]. The
Apple iOS possesses additional security features such as an encrypted fle system, a logically separated kernel, as well as a crypto engine and unique Device key, Group key, and
Apple root certifcate embedded in the device frmware to further maintain the integrity of
the mobile device [39].
Vulnerabilities present in the Apple iOS operating system are far less documented,
though not unheard of. One such vulnerability, found in [15], details exploitation of the
“goto fail” bug. Used to compromise the operating system’s use of the TLS protocol,
the bug impedes the ability of the operating system to verify digital signature certifcates,
disabling the capability of the OS to authenticate the identity of Application source de8

vices. This vulnerability may be leveraged if an attacker gains proper placement within the
network and successfully conducts a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack as a preliminary
measure to compromise the Apple Operating System [15]. Another paper,[39], further explores vulnerabilities found within the native iOS by frst exploiting the WiFi connection.
This paper investigates Public WiFi vulnerabilities present when Captive Portal or Paywall
is enabled. It was determined that a vulnerability exists when these applications query a
specifc URL: 1 .

1.2.2

Communication Layer

Communication Layer threats are also abundant, with many shared attack vectors present
in traditional computer systems with equivalent capabilities. WiFi capabilities possessed
by most smart phones have the same propensity for exploitation as traditional wireless
systems, including the potential for jamming, monitoring, and Man-in-the-Middle(MitM)
attacks. In addition, Bluetooth capabilities found on most phones may be used as an avenue for device infltration through bluejacking and bluesnarfng techniques. Bluejacking
includes transmission of unsolicited messages within local Bluetooth radio range (ten meters) while bluesnarfng allows access to unauthorized information via a Bluetooth connection.
Additional communications layer threats may be observed in open ports and sockets
designed into select third-party applications. Through the use of sockets generated by
poorly developed code, adversaries may exploit open sockets as an attack vector through an
open port in the network and also as a means to make a lateral move to other applications on
1

http://www.apple.com/library/test/success.html
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the local machine. Utilizing sockets between two applications on the same mobile device
breaks the secure sandboxed environment [9].

1.2.2.1

Mobile-Specifc Vulnerabilities

GSM and UMTS

Traditional wireless data and voice communications between Mobile

Stations and mobile cell towers, or Base Transceiver Stations (BTS), possess a variety of
generational protocols known commonly as Second Generation (2G), Third Generation
(3G), and Fourth Generation (4G). Standards prior to 4G (also known as LTE for Long
Term Evolution) are divided into two major categories: Carrier Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). GSM-based cellular
standards are Time Division Multiple-Access (TDMA) which began in the 2G domain,
morphed into 2.5G standards with General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced
Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE) transitional protocols, and evolved into Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and High Speed Packet Access (HSPA)
3G technologies. CDMA cellular standards incorporate Carrier Division Multiple Access
technology. The CDMA standards began with traditional 2G CDMA baseline technology and advanced into 3G standards with the CDMA2000 and Evolution-Data Optimized
(EVDO) standards. Both GSM and CDMA cellular standard families merged into what is
now known as the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) cellular standard. CDMA was originally
developed by Qualcomm in the United States and has spread in popularity in Canada and
parts of Asia while GSM was originally developed in Europe and only later adopted by
United States Mobile Service Providers [38] [40].
10

All of these mobile protocols are vulnerable to the same attacks as any communication
system where the adversary has physical access to the transmission medium. This includes
DoS attacks such as jamming and fooding attacks, as well as data interception, MiTM
attacks, and even battery exhaustion attacks, which force a smartphone to discharge battery
energy at a higher rate than usual [43]. It is important to address potential vulnerabilities in
all three technologies due to the fact that all three generations of technology are offered by
mobile security providers over a large area, and while some areas offer the most advanced
in LTE coverage, other areas are restricted to 2G coverage due to economic and fscal
constraints. GSM attacks include compromising encryption algorithms such as A5/1 [44]
and potentially A5/2 and A5/3 stream ciphers, the frst of which was reverse engineered in
1999 [33].
Base station spoofng is also possible by use of a rogue access point simply by mimicking or imitating a GSM base station, potentially allowing yet another avenue for a MitM
situation. An extension of this attack capability, SMS exploitation, allows for security confguration and routing confguration settings to be changed to leverage access to Mobile
Devices. International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catching and IMSI bypassing
exploit use of the IMSI number stored on each mobile device’s Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) card to track, infltrate, or otherwise manipulate a mobile end user’s access. The
IMSI is, fundamentally, a unique number possessed by each individual mobile device that
acts as an identifer for the subscriber as it is registered to its service provider’s network. It
is from this information that a Home Location Record, a directory governed by the Mobile
Service Switching Center (MSC), may initially be able to authenticate a mobile subscriber
11

to its corresponding Mobile Subscriber Service Provider and issue a Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) for external use following authentication by the Authentication Center (AuC) collocated with the HLR [14]. In order to accomplish IMSI catching,
the malicious user need only produce a rogue access point with a signal stronger than
a legitimate mobile subscriber’s BTS. The technology is such that a mobile device does
not discriminate between cell towers operating with the same protocol, confguration, and
frequency and merely looks for the cell tower with the strongest signal.
BTS spoofng is made even easier with the ability of a malicious user operating said
spoofed BTS to send terminal capability messages to modify or suppress encryption confguration settings to ensure ease of access. Encryption suppression is, of course, dependent on hardware implementations in the user’s MS and the mobile subscriber’s settings.
Finally, call session hijacking/interception may be conducted against an unsuspecting user
provided that the user and malicious actor are both within the home public land mobile network (HPLMN), or the area in which the Home Location Register (HLR) or subscription
information is stored. [32].

LTE Vulnerabilities

In [30], LTE networks are also investigated, revealing the plausi-

bility of jamming attacks but at a much greater cost to the malicious actor. Such attacks are
accomplished through exploitation of physical control channels, or channels that are used
to carry control/signaling information as well as actual data.

Service-Provider Network Vulnerabilities

A more challenging attack to execute and

therefore anticipate involves exploitation of the SS7 Signaling network, the network pro12

tocol that operates solely on the mobile service provider’s network, and is responsible for
mobile call setup and teardown as well as the avenue by which the mobile communication interfaces with the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Though designed to
be physically separate from end users, equipment and software may be utilized to generate
SS7 signal manipulation and may be responsible for a very large quantity of vulnerabilities,
from degrading or jamming a targeted group of mobile end users (MEU), eavesdropping
on any phone call within the service provider’s network regardless of proximity, or even
counterfeiting a legitimate or imaginary user’s credentials in setting up or tearing down a
call [12]. With access to the mobile service provider’s core network, it can be seen in [34]
that location disclosure may be gleaned by a malicious user simply by sending malformed
packets using known user information such as IMSI. The IMSI number iServices, such
as Locate-my-phone services and public Emergency Managements Services used to track
down users for safety purposes may be exploited for malicious use as well [34].

1.2.3

Resource Layer

The fnal layer of the smartphone model that may be exploited is the resource layer,
which involves such capabilities as onboard sensors and services as well as memory capabilities. Attacks utilizing this layer may eavesdrop on unsuspecting users by covertly
activating select sensors like microphones and cameras and then monitoring output. Such
attacks may also include monitoring GPS location data and infltrating portions of fash
memory or internal memory for capturing Personally Identifable Information(PII) or other
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such data, or for delivering or relaying a malicious payload, using the mobile device as a
hop point [43].

1.3

Vulnerability Assessment Tools
A study conducted by Kaspersky Labs in 2013, [43], stated that approximately 143,211

distinct samples of malware were identifed on mobile devices, demonstrating clear security challenges. Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 below demonstrate the wide variety of major
vulnerabilities identifed in Google Android mobile devices alone as well as the drastic
increase in overall detected vulnerabilities on the Android platform [5]. It is apparent
that through the myriad of integrated technologies, as seen in [33], the many varieties of
protocols, encryption, and widespread data translation and conversion allow many attack
vectors and points of vulnerability. These vulnerabilities, when exploited, may allow either the commencement of malicioius activity or the embedding of malware into a mobile
system with the end goal of either selection being to interrupt, eavesdrop, degrade, or destroy capabilities of the mobile device. Such attack types such as MitM, jamming, device
infltration via communication channels, and even tampering with resources such as the
camera, GPS, and battery usage may occur. [33]. With the potential for a compromise to
personal and fnancial information, a potential compromise to personal property, and even
the possibility of bodily harm as the result of a malware-induced malfunctioning phone,
the threats of malicious actors against mobile platforms must be addressed and thwarted.
A utility must be employed to properly vet mobile devices from a security standpoint and
thereby combat these cyber threats.
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Most research focuses on malware intrusion analysis [29] or malware detection [33].
Some previous works, such as [13], suggest the use of machine learning and big data
analytics techniques to help in intrusion detection. In the aforementioned construct, applications are assessed based on their granted permissions and requested permissions as
seen in Android Package (APK) fles in order to assess whether anomalous or malicious
activity is present (i.e. an application requesting the ability to send messages with “android.permission.SEND SMS” authorization with malicious intent). Through the use of
feature extraction and feature selection and with the aid of machine learning, a cluster
classifcation algorithm may be used to identify future anomalies as active malicious activity. Another paper, [20], uses imported signatures for known mobile malware, specifcally
those piggybacking otherwise legitimate APKs. Other efforts have been made specifcally
towards malware detection and classifcation using custom automated tools such as [26]
and [45]. These contributions seek to maintain a presence on the device and actively notify
the user of malicious activity and the potential presence of malware on the mobile device.
Still some other methods used to mitigate potential threats employ the use of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Protection System (IPS) technologies as seen
in [29]. Nash et. al. [44] take anomaly detection a step further and employ cloud-based
virtualization of a user so it can better detect, analyze, and respond to malware as it enters and begins operation on a mobile device. In the paper, [32], another set of services
is employed external to the mobile device, utilizing a combination of data sensors and
data mining, along with mobile agents. These combine to form “mobile response agents”
to identify and potentially mitigate attacks specifcally geared towards business informa15

tion, enterprise-level network architectures such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks, Eavesdropping, Dictionary attacks, and even Buffer Overfow attacks.
These solutions, however, fall short of properly ensuring preventative measures are
taken such as appropriate WiFi confguration settings, device access security settings [16],
and application socket limitations [9]. Therefore, an automated solution will be proposed
in this thesis, one verifying that fundamental security threat mitigation measures have been
taken from within the system by automatically scanning multiple layers of a Mobile Devices, reporting discrepancies, and rating the overall level of security. The proposed assessment tool is not intended to be all-encompassing and will not interrogate individual
applications for malicious design or behavior. It also is not intended to function actively
during normal operation and at all times, residing as an application directly on the mobile device. Rather, the tool will interface with the mobile device via a serial interface to
a computer. Furthermore, the tool will instantaneously retrieve data concerning potential
avenues by which future malicious actors may elect to leverage attacks upon the user or
for payload infltration or data exfltration.

1.4

Thesis Outline
This thesis has begun by discussing the Android Operating System and its vulnerabil-

ities, aspects of security associated with wireless communications, and current tools and
products that exist to assess the the state of security in a Mobile Device especially one
possessing the Android Operating System. The next chapter surveys areas of research
and publications that demonstrate advancements in vulnerability detection. Initially, vul16

nerability detection utilities specifc to mobile platforms are canvassed, but the sections
following proceed to examine strides in the security of alternate subjects of Cyber Security
such as Web Servers and Web Applications, Industrial Control Systems, and Enterprise networks. Chapter two further identifes the shortcomings in current technology and research
with respect to assessing weaknesses present in mobile devices and how the proposed tool
design by which various aspects and confguration settings of a mobile device may be interrogated so as to determine an evaluation of security against potential threats. Chapter
three lays out the implementation of the proposed assessment tool. Chapter four identifes
fnal conclusions based on further research and the results of the vulnerability assessment
tool and asserts places in research where efforts may still be made towards future works.
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Figure 1.1
Main layers of the Android Operating System [3]
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Figure 1.2
Example of Malware Attack Vectors Through Layers of Mobile Device [43]
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Figure 1.3
CVE Details Mobile Vulnerabilities by Year [5]
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Figure 1.4
CVE Mobile Vulnerability Statistics in 2016 [5]
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORKS

Over the last several years, efforts have been made in the realm of computer and network security specifcally dedicated to mobile platforms and other specialized systems.
Research focused on mobile devices mainly examines devices for known and identifed
malicious applications [44] or to assess normally-trusted applications for poor coding practices [27]. Outside of the realm of mobile devices, there exists many endeavors seeking
to identify known or unknown threats in a myriad of different systems from web servers
[42] to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [24], and even traditional Enterprise Networks
[23]. In this chapter, all of these lines of research are examined to aid in the derivation of a
more comprehensive tool that may more adequately serve to identify vulnerabilities within
a mobile device and mitigate future threats.

2.1 Existing Vulnerability Detection Efforts
2.1.1 Vulnerability Detection in Mobile Devices
Current security countermeasures for mobile devices are still being developed, though
they are not as extensive or robust as capabilities developed for traditional personal computers. General antivirus and application scanning software exists for mobile platforms,
but it is not widely utilized, nor does it typically monitor network traffc or application
22

heuristics. Instead, most applications are limited to signature-based detection only, which
may prove ineffective if an attacker is covert and employs obfuscation of malicious payloads and activities [44]. Even the use of specialized packaging and decompiling tools
such as JD or Dex2Jar may throw off signature detection sensors and make traditional
identifcation of malicious programs impossible [33]. One paper proposes the use of more
secure communication methods, encryption, and confgurations. In addition, it suggests
the use of a penetration test tool that utilizes a command line interface, a software-defned
radio, a hardware-based development kit to aid in emulating a base station, and a set of
pre-defned automated attack scenarios targeted at exploiting GSM communications and
generating C2 channels via SMS. This automated tool is useful, though it is limited in
scope to specifc attacks utilizing GSM technology [GSM]. Another paper, [33], suggests
the use of anomaly/heuristics detection techniques using a cloud-based framework. In addition, the system uses public metrics captured via the internet to rank an application’s
trust level. Through the use of static and dynamic analyzers in a sandbox environment in
the cloud-based system, network traffc (such as SMS traffc) and code inspection is conducted to determine if an application is safe. If determined to be free of malicious content,
the application is maintained on a list for trusted applications. A list for untrusted applications is also kept [33]. This is restricted to application security and may require signifcant
overhead.
In [27], an alternative vulnerability assessment tool is suggested as a means to scan
an Android mobile device for potential vulnerabilities. The proposed scanning tool would
assess every single application present on a phone individually, conducting blanket testing
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for vulnerabilities. Once this is accomplished, the application would be reverse engineered
from the .apk archive package fle to a variant of .java source code where the code would
be scanned for secure coding compliance. Any anomalous or insecure code would be corrected, and a new program would be built. Once a keystore is generated for the individual
program to ensure authenticity in future, the application would be rebuilt and signed. This
process would be done for virtually every program that would be run on the mobile device. While elements may be automated, some portions may require manual intervention
to ensure the rewritten program was coded securely.
Not only are vulnerability assessments used for securing mobile devices, but they may
be used to pinpoint weaknesses. One source, [21], highlights the use of a specifed tool
“adb” as part of a hacking methodology framework to do initial reconnaissance before
conducting malicious activity. The tool, “adb” is used to open a command line shell within
the mobile environment through a USB connection to a computer. Using this connection,
a scanning application known as “drozer” or “dz” is used. In one scenario, drozer is used
to scan installed application packages for specifc permissions on installed applications,
especially those that possess the “INSTALL PACKAGES” capability. This particular capability was originally intended to allow an application to download updates and associated
dependencies freely and without the use of the Google Play Store. However, if exploited,
this may serve as an avenue for unchecked traffc and malicious payload delivery.
Other such capabilities using drozer involve the use of activity scanners to identify
enabled “activities” on select applications that may also be used as attack vectors in future attacks. Scan modules such as “scanner.activity.browsable” allow for full visibility of
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applications and may lead to identifcation of WebView-enabled applications. WebView
capabilities, as previously stated, were designed for ease of use for programmers to embed
internal browsers into other applications for select data and package retrieval via HTTP
but may be exploited for malicious purposes. Adb scans such as “adb shell netstat -antp —
grep LISTEN” may be used to scan visible ports on the device, while select scanner modules such as “scanner.provider.injection” may be used to test on-board applications for SQL
Injection weaknesses. Adb is truly a powerful tool that may be used for not only forensic
and exploitation purposes, but also for conducting general vulnerability assessments.

2.1.2 Detection Methods in Alternative Environments
2.1.2.1 Web Servers and Web Applications
The paper [42] takes a tailored approach to detecting vulnerabilities in web applications
through a specially-designed four-step process: identify application and known vulnerabilities, analyze application for weaknesses and means by which vulnerabilities may be exploited, test the application using various assessment tools, and report and classify results
and identify threat severity. This method executes a vulnerability assessment of web applications utilizing various components, both open-source and commercial ones. The testing
approach is determined based on a survey of the targeted application, development platform, known weaknesses based on development platform, subsequently developed testing
parameters, and fnally, appropriately chosen tool selection. Analysis of known vulnerabilities researched using publicly published vulnerability websites and databases such
as OWASP, CVE, etc., helps to dictate the appropriate tools to use to properly analyze
potential weaknesses. These include port-specifc scanning for protocols such as Trans25

port Layer Security (TLS and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols using port 443; specifc access control settings such as those associated with HTTP proxy use and log-on
requirements; assessment for web address forwarding and security misconfguration; misconfguration of other security settings such as those responsible for Cross-Site Tracing,
Cross-Site Request Forgery, SQL Injection Attacks, and validation of input to detect malicious inputting of data; and verifcation of host authentication to ensure access control.
Subsequent testing, as stated, is determined by assessment of known vulnerabilities for
the given web application. A comparative analysis of randomly-selected vulnerability assessment tools used specifcally for web applications includes Nikto, used to assess web
server security and implemented in Perl; PenTest Tool, which is a web-based tool; and
Web Application Attack and Audit Framework (W3AF) developed in Python.
In one such test, the tool W3AF is used to determine if the web app utilizes shared
hosting to any entity over the WAN by interrogating the XAMPP with an HTTP GET
request. Additionally, Cross-Site Request Forgery weaknesses are assessed by sending a
forged HTTP request to the suspected web application. With the use of Pykto, a plugin for
W3AF, the name platform and version of the XAMPP server may be identifed. From there,
a staged attack may be conducted injecting a malicious script into an HTTP GET request.
One additional test includes scanning the web application for Cross Site Tracing (XST)
vulnerabilities via the HTTP TRACK method, which would allow a malicious user to query
and track cookies for information received by the other end of the request chain in a clientserver connection. Finally, Nikto is used to determine incorrect confguration of security
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settings by inspecting the access control settings of the password storage fle which, if not
confgured correctly, may allow for a compromise of user or admin credentials.

2.1.2.2

Industrial Control Systems

Even more complex systems with nontraditional networks, such as Industrial Control
Systems, require assessment tools to pinpoint weaknesses in their architecture. As can be
seen in [24], a SCADA system utilizing a typical MODBUS TCP test bed developed to
simulate a power grid is used to detect potential vulnerabilities. It relies on real-time monitoring of synchrophasor data passed through the Operational Technology networks. An
Event Detection System is used, along with a more intelligent intrusion detection system
powered by machine learning techniques with the aid of data mining for the identifcation
of anomalous behavior within the network. While this system works well for just-in-time
reaction and behavioral detection of individual networks in real-time based on historical
heuristics, it is not suitable for a preliminary vulnerability assessment. It does, however,
provide a good framework for detecting and classifying potentially malicious activity. A
causal event graph (CEG) is used to establish a Bayesian network as a means by which
cyber-physical system rules may be identifed for future incidents. Many aspects of the
synchrophasor data are analyzed and captured in large datasets to establish a baseline for
the system. Once the baseline is determined, various attack scenarios are conducted, ranging from reconnaissance attacks to command and reading injection attacks and even denial
of service attacks. These events are fagged as malicious in data post-processing and run
through machine learning algorithms. With the aid of software such as Matlab, a graphical
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representation of the algorithm run against future test sets may be established to demonstrate validation of the algorithm and identify false positives and false negatives detected
during the fnal phase of testing.

2.1.2.3

Enterprise Networks

The paper, [23], identifes a vulnerability assessment tool as the only tool that “...allows the system administrator to proactively fnd the security holes before any attacks try
to exploit them.” It highlights the importance of Intrusion Prevention Systems and frewall use as well as tools used for scanning fles to detect malicious payloads, but identifes
that vulnerability scanners tend to have adverse effects on the networks and systems they
interrogate. Bandwidth and productivity levels may be compromised as a result of a vulnerability scan and lead to events such as server crashes. To combat this, the paper proposed
the use of a “Featherweight Virtual Machine” (FVM) known as a Vulnerability Assessment
Support Engine (VASE). Unlike commercial programs such as Nessus, the proposed tool
would clone the system targeted for assessment [23].
The paper discusses not only the importance of establishing a proper Hardware Abstraction virtual layer to mimic the hardware and an Operating System virtual layer to
mimic the software of the targeted system, but it also goes into an analysis of the vulnerability assessment tools used previously. It examines the value of extracting a network
server’s banner to determine version number as a means to identify general vulnerabilities
associated with the system. It also points out the possibility of passive network scanning
and the limitations of such a feat, as this requires activity on the part of a malicious entity
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within the system in order to prove effective. It fnally considers the possibility of logging on to the system and doing an audit of a workstation’s patch to determine the level of
security [23].
The VASE product seeks to establish High Testing Fidelity, Full State Isolation, and
Automation utilizing the FVM component as well as a network application duplicator.
Using the FVM portion of the VASE product, a clone of the system is used with a “copyon-write” system, allowing fle and registry changes made on the target system to be maintained on the FVM. The visualization logic of the FVM, implemented in the form of a
kernel driver, is used in addition to a separate, specialized DLL for the use of intercepting
Win32 API calls. This ensures that undocumented system calls and also more advanced
system calls otherwise undetected by kernel-level interceptors are still recognized. The
logic is broken into the following categories of virtualization: console processes, service
processes, fles, registry, object, interprocess, and network. A list of running processes on
the virtual machine is maintained within the FVM, and a callback routine is utilized using
the kernel function “PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine” in order to identify and document
new processes and associate the parent process IDs. Utilizing a DLL hooking technique,
the FVM also intercepts “CreateService” calls to document further and to replicate new
services that would otherwise generate in the Service Control Manager Database. To handle fle management, FVM interrogates system calls related to fle manipulation and makes
proper duplication on the virtual machine necessary. Inter-process Communication among
processes in the FVM is isolated for security purposes where it may otherwise be allowed.
These avenues would include shared memory, a dedicated pipe, and even local procedure
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calls. DDE and COM are also possible mechanisms used for inter-process communication
[23].
It was determined by the testers that the concept of visualization was conceptually
simple yet practically challenging. Consistency was a named issue for process renaming
and duplication, and it was further stated that some services may not be duplicated.

2.2

A Proposed Automated Vulnerability Assessment Tool
From the research gathered, there is no known tool identifed that scans simply for pre-

liminary weaknesses in such things as WiFi settings on an Android mobile device. With
the ever-increasing use of mobile devices for both everyday and sensitive application, the
commercial market is in desperate need of a security utility that can effciently assess the
security posture of a mobile device before malware ever attempts to access it. In the utilizing of many of the aforementioned preventative methods as well as implementation of
well-known mobile forensics practices [35] [25] and the reconnaissance and vulnerability
assessment phase of the mobile hacker methodology [18] [21], a more robust vulnerability
assessment tool may be built, one that may prevent malware from ever entering a mobile
device.
An automated tool can more adequately identify attack vectors for malicious entry onto
a mobile device. Such an automated tool will be used to investigate more of the potential
attack surface in an effort to identify a wider array of attacks. Portability and ease of use
need to be addressed, which will require the implementation of several forms of scanning
over each layer of the Mobile System.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ASSESSMENT TOOL

3.1 Proposed Tool Implementation Components
The initial scan will be of the operating system to ensure it is fully patched and the
most recent update has been downloaded and installed for that particular platform. The
“adb” program, short for “Android Debug Bridge,” is the best candidate to interface with
the Android device in order to accomplish this task. [1]. This application allows for client,
server, and daemon service generation on an android platform [1]. It has been determined
that this capability may be especially benefcial in scanning aspects of the operating system
security settings [18]. The design will especially address previously seen attacks such as
those found in Table 3.1 [5].
The “ADB” utility will be used for the purposes of conducting various forensics scans
and data capture to determine the potential vulnerability of aspects of the mobile device,
such as application permissions and system security features [18]. Further scanning for
security measures will need to be performed to ensure that the phone is not “rooted” and
that select confgurations in the local database cannot be manually augmented to make the
device otherwise vulnerable. The tool will also seek to identify the presence of system settings that may thwart malicious software or actions taken by malicious software, such as
priviledge escalation and the identifcation of any applications with excessive or dangerous
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permissions. The full disk encryption feature will be queried to verify that it is enabled and
will report back if otherwise. Any applications possessing WebView capabilities will also
be fagged as potentially vulnerable based on select permissions settings. Other capabilities
possessed by applications such as those that have the “INSTALL PACKAGES” confguration setting enabled will be fagged for similar reasons [1]. Finally, backup services will
be verifed as enabled.
In addition to Application and system-level security, communication-level security
must be assessed. This assessment includes inspecting potentially vulnerable open ports
on the mobile device. It also includes inspecting virtual communication channels between
neighboring applications as well as between applications and outbound avenues of communication, known as sockets [9]. Recent wireless access points via WiFi and Mobile Communications Service (i.e. 2G, 3G, 4G) will be interrogated within the local database, such
as those in “consolidated.db,” to determine what access points may be vulnerable, either in
not allowing mutual authentication or through a femto cell. Also, saved WiFi and Bluetooth
connections will be interrogated to ensure proper security practices are in place. Using
an onboard automated script to query the SQLite database for relevant information, such
as that found in location “/data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db,”
one can parse the known WiFi connection history to interrogate each entry and ensure
proper password usage and encryption. Similar VPN, SSL, and TLS confguration settings
will be verifed to ensure they are in use and being implemented properly [35].
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Finally, proper restrictions on resource-level assets will be verifed. This includes verifying up-to-date drivers and proper access controls for the Linux fle system and attached
sensors, such as the microphone, camera, and GPS.
The automated assessment tool was implemented in the Python programming language.
Additional forensics practices were implemented on an as-needed basis and inline with
common forensics practices [25]. Table 3.1 below highlights the critical components to be
assessed in the next section.
Table 3.1
Attack Vectors
Vector
Operating System
Application
SMS/MMS
WiFi
Bluetooth
Near Field Communications
Mobile-Specifc Communications
On-board Sensors

Severity
Layer
High
Application
Low to High
Application
Low to Medium
Application
Medium to High Communication
Medium to High Communication
Medium to High Communication
High
Communication
High
Resource
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3.2

Components of Vulnerability Assessment
Many steps were taken in the advancement of the vulnerability assessment tool. Stages

of tool development included initial research and testing platform development, assessment
tool feature development, tool and feature refnement through experimentation, validation
of compatibility to other mobile devices, and assurance of coverage for current mobile
device vulnerabilities.

3.2.1

Developing the Testing Platform

In order to build an assessment tool that could properly determine the attack surface of
a mobile device, much research and input went into what constituted a suitable platform for
testing and vulnerability analysis. The key criteria for the mobile device were: a popular
device series that utilized the Android operating system, a device that was new and free
from a subscriber contract so there would be no concerns over a voided contract or warranty
if tampered with or rooted, and one that would be reasonably priced as experiments may
result in an inoperable piece of hardware. The device elected to validate the vulnerability
assessment tool was a Samsung Galaxy S3 mobile phone model type SGH-I747 with the
Android 4.4.2 Mobile Operating System. The phone was given temporary GSM Cellular
network access with AT&T as the registered Mobile Service Provider (MSP).
Access to the device was established via USB using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
command-line tool. This allowed for communication with the underlying Linux operating system upon which the Android Java Graphical User Interface resides [1]. The ADB
program’s original intent is to ensure an interface with a Personal Computer (PC) or equiv34

alent device to load and test various software components of the Android platform such
as new or custom-made revisions of the Android OS, bootloaders, and third-party applications. Components of the ADB tool include the employment of a client component run on
the development machine and used to generate and send commands, a daemon component
that exists as a background process on the mobile device and used to execute the aforementioned commands, and fnally a server component used to manage and maintain the
communication link between the mobile device and the development machine upon which
it operates [1].
In order for an individual to access critical features and settings within the Android
Operating System, root access to the underlying Linux-based kernel is required. This is
traditionally disabled by default to the standard owning user as authorizing root access to
the owning user subsequently allows for massive security holes in the device. This is the
case because, traditionally, user-installed apps are generally granted the same permissions
only up to the level of the originating user. Android developers intentionally limit user
access to portions of the operating system in order to maintain a level of security. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is maintained among applications on the system as system
applications that were preinstalled or are included in patches by the service provider or
manufacturer may maintain root access to core services, while user-installed applications
remain segregated and limited in capability [22].
Upon initial startup, a mobile device possessing an Android Operating System initializes using the on-board Android OS or “ROM” which stands for read-only memory. From
this point, the bootloader is used to load the Linux kernel into Random-Access Memory
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(RAM), and from this point the initial master process or “init” is run to seed all child system processes responsible for forming the infrastructure and interface to the kernel upon
which the Dalvik VM and system server may operate [19].
Root access was established using the CF-Auto-Root program, a replacement “bootloader” that brings with it customized Samsung frmware and easy rooting capabilities [2].
The program leverages another feature called “fastboot” or “HBoot” mode which initially
boots up the device with a more primitive interface and structure and the ability to initiate boot-up settings such as Recovery Mode using custom image fles. With the aid of
the corresponding ClockWorkMod recovery image whose source code can be found in the
CWM-Recovery.tar fle, the replacement bootloader was used as a Read-Only Memory
(ROM) Manager application to assist in the establishment of root and system-level applications, specifcally “SuperSU,” which allows for full access to the device, including the
ability to escalate privileges of an ADB shell lending full permissions and access to the
running ADB daemon [19]. With this capability, all manner of ADB commands and ADB
shells generated are afforded access to the fles and parameters necessary to determine the
state of security within the mobile device. Figure 3.1 highlights data fow of the system
and how the communication channel through the USB port of the mobile device will ultimately allow an assessor to gain and maintain access to the device for security-related data
extraction and analysis.
Once root access was achieved, efforts were made to identify database and fle entries
and build properties relavant to security. With the assistance of [22] and [35], databases
such as those found in “/data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases” were down36

loaded using the “adb pull” command. Once downloaded to the testing workstation, a
Mozilla Firefox plugin called SQLite Manager was downloaded to inspect the database
structure and specifc database attributes [8]. It is from this inspection along with Android
Developer documentation that a proper parameter listing was made [7]. Using these artifacts along with the foreknowledge of previously-researched security concerns dictated
much of the architecture of the assessment tool.

3.2.2 Anatomy of the Assessment Tool
3.2.2.1 Program Design
The program is developed in python using the 2.7 release framework. The assessment
tool program is designed to both inject shell commands into the Android mobile device
and capture and parse the results and also to use adb “pull” commands to capture relevant
confguration fles, XML fles, and .db fles. Once data is captured, it is further processed to
glean relevant security information, and an assessment is made based on the status of individual parameters and artifacts. If a vulnerability is detected, each item is given a “LOW,”
“MEDIUM,” or “HIGH” vulnerability rating based generally on Table 3.1 with specifc
ratings offered in Table 3.2. All output is stored in an output “.txt” fle named “MobileSecurityReport” followed by the time and date (local) when the report is conducted. The program is broken up into four main components: General System Settings, Communications
Layer, Application Layer, and Resource Layer. Artifacts are retrieved through automated
python commands using the Subprocess Python library. Using such ADB commands as
“shell” and “pull” with corresponding parameters allows for the extraction of said features
for vulnerability analysis. Above, Figure 3.1 showcases the interface and controlled data
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Figure 3.1
The Vulnerability Assessment Tool [1]
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fow between the assessment tool Python program on the assessment workstation and the
assessed mobile device. Using the ADB program via the USB interface on both the computer and the mobile device, a link is established with an autogenerated ADB daemon. This
daemon background process is granted root access via the “SuperSU” program from the
previous rooting process and, with the aid of prompts driven by the vulnerability program
and subsequent ADB client program, extracts relevant data for analysis.
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 below demonstrate the general procedures of the vulnerability
assessment program. In Figure 3.2, it may be seen how the Python program is designed
to expect input from the user in order to execute a specifc module that is associated with
a layer or substantial security component module of the device. Figure 3.3 further breaks
down the execution of an individual layer or module to identify the algorithm associated
with capture of a specifc artifact of security datum, output variable storage, and fnal output
delivery to the vulnerability assessment fle.

3.2.2.2

System Settings

Initially, general system settings and identifcation artifacts were targeted within the
mobile device. The ADB command “adb shell su -c getprop [PROPERTY NAME]” from
within a Windows Command prompt was used to retrieve select data. In this instruction,
the “shell” component generates a shell from within Linux, the “su” parameter elevates
the user permissions to root-level, and the “-c” parameter specifes execution of a single
shell command with exit upon completion. The “getprop” parameter is an ADB-specifc
command that is the equivalent of performing a “cat” or concatenate command on the
39

Figure 3.2
Flowchart of Process Execution of the Overall Vulnerability Assessment Program
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Figure 3.3
Flowchart of Process Execution in a Specifc Module
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Linux kernel build property fle found in “/system/build.prop.” This allows for the capture
of the Device Model, the Device Model number, the Client ID, the Device Numerical
Identifer, the Device Product ID if present, the Android OS Version, the Android API
level, and the Linux Kernel Version. This information becomes relevant in ensuring proper
documentation for archiving purposes and in determining compatibility of the vulnerability
assessment tool with the native hardware and associated operating system. These artifacts
also help identify potential vulnerabilities, such as whether the operating system is still
supported and receives active updates and patches from Android.

3.2.2.3

Communication Layer

At the communications layer, a combination of parameters and confgurations settings
relevant to different communications protocols was addressed. This included identifying settings specifc to Cellular, Bluetooth, WiFi, and NFC communications as well as
the analysis of all open network connections. These efforts were made to account for all
communications channels that collectively make up the physical or Radio Frequency (RF)
component of the attack surface.
WiFi or 802.11x capabilities are examined by specifcally capturing the status of the
WiFi radio itself via the “wif on” fag and the “wif scan always enabled” fag found in
the “global” table of “settings.db.” These fags identify whether the WiFI radio is enabled and if the WiFi device continues to send broadcast probes so that it may identify
wireless networks within local proximity of the device. The fnal Wif Component is the
password analysis module, which begins by performing an adb shell “cat” command of
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the “wpa supplicant.conf” fle found at location “/data/misc/wif” and storing the output
to a local fle entitled “WifOutputFile.txt.” The Python program subsequently scans the
contents of the fle to identify previously established connections to WiFi Wireless Access
Points identifed by Service Set Identifers(SSID). Each network record is examined to assess whether the SSID is broadcast or easily visible to any individual polling within proximity and whether wireless encryption is employed in the communications link and, if so,
what type is used (WEP, WPA, WPA2). Additionally it is determined whether a password
is required to utilize the wireless access point and whether the password is suffciently
strong based on the contents and length of the password [44]. The reported vulnerability level is determined based on strength of encryption combined with password strength.
Strength in both of these cases is with reference to amount of time and effort necessary to
decipher a password through brute force methods. If either the password or encryption algorithm is insuffcient, malicious actors may be capable of infltrating the wireless network
and may potentially conduct a MiTM attack on the connected mobile device.
The settings associated with close proximity communications protocols, those being
Bluetooth, Samsungs “SBeam” and Near-Field Communications (NFC) protocols, were
also checked for vulnerabilities. One setting was captured using the “adb settings global”
command examining the Bluetooth radio status fag, “Bluetooth on.” However, capturing
the remaining settings requires the use of the “dumpsys” command from within a shell
generated with ADB. The “dumpsys” command returns various values for specifed system services, and in the context of this application, the typical command read as follows:
“adb shell su -c dumpsys [SERVICE NAME].” The output gives diagnostics and also the
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name and value of associated global variables usually visible to other systems and, if permitted, third-party applications [4]. This included capturing the NFC fag value by using
a subsequent “grep” command to flter output for the NFC module and return the contents
of the parameter “mState.”
Samsung’s “SBeam” settings were not visible in either of these locations, however,
and are rather stored in a .xml fle at location “/data/data/com.android.settings/sharedprefs/com.android.settings preferences.xml.” Extracting this information was accomplished
by simply using the concatenation shell command along with a pipe and “grep” to extract
the “s beam settings” variable to identify whether the radio was active.
Access to the Mobile Service Provider network was also analyzed to address the possibility of a vulnerability between the mobile system and the BTS. With regard to legacy networks that may not require mutual authentication for connection, the “preferred network mode”
parameter was queried from the “Global” table of the “Settings” database. A numerical
value is used to identify the protocols or cellular standards authorized for communication
when interfacing with a BTS (GSM, CDMA, EvDO, etc.). This setting is set by the MSP
and, therefore, is not able to be directly controlled by the individual. It is at the discretion
of the provider to limit access to its network and prevent unauthorized access and “Cell
Spoofng.” As GSM and other equivalent 2G, 2.5G, and some 3G technologies do not require mutual authentication between the user and the cell tower, a vulnerability may exist
if the MSP does not limit allowed protocols available for use between a mobile device and
the BTS.
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While [35] identifed the “optables.db” database fle as possessing relevant BTS information, either the variant of Android, the manufacturer, or the specifc model of mobile device did not possess current information regarding cellular towers. “Femto cell”
operational information was found by analyzing an open-source product known as “Femtocell Catcher,” an application used to actively seek out connections to Femto cells and,
if any are discovered, disable cellular network access and instead operate in “Airplane
mode.” In studying the source code for this product, it was discovered that the tasking required to accurately identify cell tower information via the “Telephony.manager” or “Telephony.registry” may only be accomplished using internal API calls and therefore mandate
an application written in Java and run with full root-level permissions from within the device. This surpasses the initial scope of the proposed tool. As “Femtocel Catcher” and
the associated research [10] was specifcally designed for CDMA femto cells, and the device utilized a GSM-equivalent network, there is no guarantee that this approach would
even prove successful if it were implemented in the same manner. More research and resources would be signifcant to properly identify the presence of a femto cell connection,
so this component may be better addressed in future works. The “mobile network” fag
is also identifed as necessary to inform the user whether a data communication channel
is allowed to the tower. This fnal fag is entirely informational and is not inherently a
vulnerability.
In the analysis of open UDP/TCP network sockets, the program frst reported all open
and established ports. This was accomplished by using the “netstat” command from within
an adb shell. The output generated notifes the user of all active connections on the device.
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An additional command is run also using “netstat,” but in this case, only TCP/UDP open
sockets in “LISTEN” state are identifed as connections. Connections in the “LISTEN”
state are considered passively open and may be exploited by unsuspecting users [18] [6].
Finally, an additional “netstat” connection scan is conducted utilizing the grep command
so as to pinpoint potentially vulnerable protocols associated with particular ports.

3.2.2.4

Application Layer

Regarding application layer security, it is very diffcult to determine whether all applications are inherently secure. To address security of applications without access to
application source code, the frst alternative is to assess active applications. A listing of
active applications is generated in the output fle using the command “adb shell su -c ps,”
which includes information about each application, such as the generated User(“USER”)
that initiates/controls the process, the Process Identifer (PID), the Parent Process Identifer
(PPID), the Virtual Byte Size (“VSIZE”) of the data or data byte size in virtual memory,
Real Byte Size (“RSS”) or data byte size in real memory, the address in kernel memory in
which the program resides at rest, and the name (“NAME”) of the process itself [41]. It
should be noted that any listed application typically has select Linux-level access control
fle permissions of the same level as the user that generated it. Additional outputs include
identifying all applications with root-level access control authority. This includes identifying all applications (both system and third-party applications) that are generated by user
“root.” A modifed adb shell “ps” command is used with a STDOUT pipe into grep command for lines with “root” user access. Additionally, it is determined in [35] that processes
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may operate with permissions of other processes or under the auspices of another user by
utilizing the Shared UserID setting in Linux. According to [35], a Shared UserID is used
to share processes and data between applications. A Shared UserID of “1000” is normally
reserved for the “system” user, just one level from root, but it may be authorized to share
with other applications to operate as root. To locate all applications with a Shared User
ID equal to “1000,” a fltered concatenation of the “packages.xml” fle is used to extract
all entries containing “sharedUserId=1000.” The command used is: “adb shell su -c cat
/data/system/packages.xml — grep ’sharedUserId=”1000“’.” As an additional informative
measure, system and third-party packages installed on the mobile device are listed using
the ADB Package Manager commands “adb -s [deviceName] shell su -c pm list packages
-s” and “adb -s [deviceName] shell su -c pm list packages -3.” An assessment is also conducted on all listed packages to identify the presence of antivirus applications. Though this
capability traditionally only covers backup services and signature-based malware detection
and prevention, it is another feature that may otherwise improve the overall security of the
device.
In addition to active processes, the permissions allotted to each application had to be
inspected to determine those of particularly high risk. To accomplish this, a listing of all
applications and associated permissions were produced using the adb shell command “adb
shell dumpsys package” which returns a great deal of information regarding all installed
packages on the device, including each installed package or application and permissions
granted to each. The output was processed and subsequently stored in the fle “package.txt.” Then, the python program parsed each package entry in the fle to match relevant
47

permissions associated with each package with a listing of permissions identifed as highrisk, medium-risk, and low-risk vulnerabilities located in the Python lists named “HighVulnPermList,” “MediumVulnPermList,” and “LowVulnPermList.” High-risk permissions
include “android.permission.INTERNET,” which may allow an application free access to
the internet and the ability to browse independently of a web browser and devoid of user interaction. Also, the “android.permission.SEND SMS” permission was included to identify
applications that may send SMS messages freely. This may be a point of concern, as malicious actors can use this capability as a channel for data exfltration. Low-risk permissions
such as “android.permission.READ CALENDAR” do not compromise critical resources,
but may still be considered invasive if later exploited.
Android “intents” or additional application actions may be investigated further for potential vulnerabilities. An example of such is the “android.intent.category.BROWSABLE”
entry also found in the “package.xml” or the package output used for package or application permissions. Using additional postprocessing of collected data in the “packages.txt”
fle, intents may be extracted and reported. Additional settings were selected for the report
using previously-mentioned tactics, namely the extraction of the “install non market apps”
and “sms default application” parameters. These parameters are stored in the global and
secure tables of the “settings.db” database and are extracted via previously defned methods. Additionally, applications may be imported onto an Android device via the USB connection. A setting exists in the Android OS that requires any imported applications to be
scanned before installation may occur. To verify this, the “verify apps over usb” parameter
must be set, and the assessment tool verifes this setting via an adb shell concatenation com48

mand, “cat,” of the “settings preferences.xml” fle located in the device fle directory at location “/data/data/com.android.settings/shared prefs/com.android.settigns preferences.xml.”

3.2.2.5

Resource Layer

At the Resource layer, most settings investigated dealt with ensuring the security of
such things as internal fash memory, kernel-level permission settings, and physical security of the device. The most immediate test accomplished was to seek out whether the
device had been “rooted.” Under present conditions, it is expected that a fag will be raised
to identify that the device is in fact rooted, as root access is required to ensure that the
assessment tool has access to all required confguration settings, fles, and directories. Be
that as it may, this component is still included with the assumption that, in an ideal scenario, agreements may be made with the manufacturer to allow selective root access, and
special permissions may be authorized to ensure that the necessary information remains
retrievable. In order to ascertain whether the device is “rooted” the property parameters
“ro.secure” and “ro.debuggable” were captured using the “getprop” ADB feature. In normal user builds of the device, if the “ro.secure” fag is clear and the “ro.debuggable” fag
is set, the device has almost certainly been rooted. Another indicator of root access having
been granted to the user is the inclusion of the “su” subdirectory found within the location
“/system/xbin.” Either of these conditions may indicate a high vulnerability in the mobile
device. The physical security of the device was also determined by examining the status of
lock screen parameters associated with the presence of a password and the inclusion of the
lock screen timeout feature. The lock screen timeout feature was determined as enabled
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after querying the “preferred network mode” parameter entry in the global table of the
“settings.db” database using the ADB program’s shell “settings get” command. Identifying the presence of a password required looking in the “data/system/password.key” fle and
the “/data/system/gesture.ke” fle for a valid entry. If a hash value exists in either fle, the
mobile device does have an active password-enabled lock screen. Additionally, the GPS radio is only available for use by applications residing on the device based on the contents of
the “location providers allowed” parameter. If the radio is disabled by the user, this value
remains empty, but if the user enables the software-based feature, the parameter includes
a string of programs with the authority to pull GPS location data. An ADB shell “settings
get” request was also utilized to query the “Secure” table of the “settings.db” database, and
if the corresponding feld is not empty, the GPS radio is enabled and the listed programs
identify which programs have access to the device’s GPS information.
SELinux (or Security-Enhanced Linux) is an enhanced Linux security model designed
into Linux to allow for greater control over individual processes such as those with root
privileges, to prevent data leakage due to misconfgured programs, and to enforce more
fnely-detailed security policy through things such as Policy Event Logging, privilege escalation avoidance, and Mandatory Access Control that helps with type enforcement and
multi-level security [22]. To determine whether this feature is present and enabled, the
build properties fle was once again requested using the ADB shell “getprop” command
and retrieving the “ro.build.selinux.enforce” fag. Other settings such as netstats accessibility and device backup were verifed by using the shell settings get request to access the
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“netstats enabled” and “backup enabled” parameters in the “global” and “secure” tables
respectively of the “settings.db” database.
Another method of vulnerability detection utilized in the assessment tool is the employment of a vulnerability database captured from MITRE’s CVE website [11]. Using
a recent download of the database in a Comma-Separated Value (CSV) fle format, dataprocessing was initially conducted to reduce the entries to Android-specifc vulnerabilities.
Using further processing of this data, with respect to previously-captured system parameters about the assessed mobile device, a search algorithm parses through the “description”
feature of each entry to identify applicable vulnerabilities. Such relevant system variables
include the Android OS version, the Linux Kernel version and build, and the model number of the device. This functions as a proof of concept, though the entries outputted to
the fnal output fle do not account for potential patches. Additionally, the nature of the
database is such that syntax in the database entries may inhibit accurate detection of some
vulnerabilities. Further expansion or replacement of this concept may be explored more
thoroughly in future works.
The fnal component of the program is supplementary fle removal. In this segment, all
supporting fles created for the purposes of data retrieval and data processing are removed.
These fles include “networkListing.txt,” “package.txt,” and “WifOutputFile.” This is
accomplished using the Python “os.remove([FILENAME])” command. Table 3.2 below
identifes all major features captured during the duration of the mobile device assessment
as well as assigned vulnerability levels.
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Table 3.2
Mobile Device Vulnerability Assessment Feature List
Layer
Feature
Vulnerability
System
Device Model
N/A
System
Device Manufacturer
N/A
System
Device Numerical Identifer
N/A
System
Android OS Version
N/A
System
Android OS Alias
N/A
Resource
Android API Level
HIGH
Resource
Linux Version
N/A
Resource
GPS Status
LOW/MEDIUM
Resource
GPS-Accessible Components/Applications
MEDIUM/HIGH
Resource
SELinux Status
HIGH
Resource
ADB status
HIGH
Resource
Android Developer’s Mode Status
HIGH
Resource
Full Disk Encryption Support/Status
HIGH
Resource
Device Backup Status
LOW
Resource
Lockscreen/Keyguard Status
MEDIUM/HIGH
Resource
Device Root Status
HIGH
Resource
CVE Vulnerabilities
HIGH
Communication
Preferred Network Mode
HIGH
Communication
Bluetooth Radio Status
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
WiFi Radio Status
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
NFC Radio Status
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
S-Beam Radio Status
LOW
Communication
Mobile Data Status
NONE
Communication
“Netstats” Status
LOW
Communication
SMS/MMS Default Application
LOW/MEDIUM
Communication
WIFI WAP ANALYSIS MODULE
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
Network Connections
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
Open Sockets in LISTEN Mode
MEDIUM/HIGH
Communication
DNS Servers
NONE
Application
Allowance of Non-market Applications
MEDIUM/HIGH
Application
Application Verifcation Required Status
HIGH
Application
Running Processes
NONE
Application
Processes with Root/system-level Permissions MEDIUM/HIGH
Application
PERMISSIONS MODULE
LOW/HIGH
Application
System/Third-Party Identifcation
N/A
Application
Anti-virus Detection
MEDIUM
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3.3

Experimentation
Initial experimentation was accomplished using a Samsung Galaxy S3 which possesses

the Android OS build 4.4.4 or “Kitkat.” The aforementioned commands were arranged into
corresponding modules to be called from a Windows workstation in Command Prompt.
Once each command was individually verifed for proper syntax and all associated postprocessing data modules were verifed using dummy data fles and test data, automated
modules were fashioned using Python’s “subprocess” class. These automated modules
include data types such as “processes,” “permissions,” and “network” as well as layerspecifc modules such as “application,” “communication,” and “resource” modules.
The communication layer security component was tested by enabling and disabling
select features such as the WiFi and Bluetooth radios in the software settings and running
the automated tool during each instant to ensure the settings were properly captured. In
addition, real and fctitious WiFi Access Point confguration settings were entered with
varying password lengths, complexities, and encryption algorithms to ensure that each
Access Point was adequately tested for vulnerabilities. Applications that maintain an open
connection were selected and activated within the mobile device to ensure that any open
socket connections, especially those in “LISTEN” mode, were detected and reported.
Analysis of the application layer component of the assessment tool was determined
by seeking out select applications with known high-level required permissions and those
determined by other sources to be potentially vulnerable. This was done in order to observe
potential excessive permissions and intent requests made by select applications. These
applications included: “Whatsapp,” “Skype,” “Fake and Real SMS Scheduler,” and “Friend
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Locator,” just to name a few. Identifcation of potential vulnerabilities within the resource
layer also deemed important were identifed and reported within the output fle. Resourcelevel association and potential avenues of access were determined based on enabled or
disabled settings, while others were refected in the output of permissions associated with
various installed applications.

Figure 3.4
The Assessment Tool Output in Command Prompt Selecting All Modules

In Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, example output may be seen from where the automated
application was run. If no layer or module is selected upon program execution, the program
defaults to running all modules possessed within the tool. If improper module names are
given as arguments to the program, an error message is given with a “help” option to
demonstrate proper syntax and modules available for execution. An example of incorrect
input may be seen below in Figure 3.6. If executed properly, the output fle is generated
with the requested module or modules in text format as can be seen in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.5
The Assessment Tool Output in Command Prompt Selecting Only the Wif and
Application Modules

Figure 3.6

The Assessment Tool Output in Command Prompt when Improper Input Detected
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Figure 3.7
The Beginning of the Vulnerability Assessment Output Text File [1]
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3.4

Application to Other Mobile Devices
In order to measure the effectiveness of the vulnerability assessment tool across multi-

ple platforms made by different companies and possessing different releases of the Android
OS, additional phones were procured and rooted. The second successfully rooted phone
was the LG Nexus 5 which possessed the Android OS build 5.0.1. When establishing a
root presence on the LG mobile device, the automated rooting, development, and administrative program “Nexus Root Toolkit v1.9” was used. This program possesses the ability
to unlock and root various model releases of the LG Nexus series production line requiring only the inclusion of select payload fles and build release of the current image of the
Android OS. The use of the Team Win Recovery Project (TWRP) Manager tool was also
used as a recovery program to allow for alternate bootloader usage and “SuperSU” rooted
user software package installation.
Execution of the automated assessment tool on the LG Nexus 5 proved effective with
most parameters remaining intact with proper outputs. The few exceptions that required
additional attention included the lack of a device model number (“ro.build.PDA”), a Client
ID number (“ro.com.google.clientbase.ms”), and an alteration in the manner in which the
ADB Security fag was stored (“ro.adb.secure”). These properties may be found in build
properties located in the “/system/build.prop” fle on the Android device. The frst two
parameters are omitted in the LG device, and the third ADB-specifc parameter stores the
value as a “null” character rather than a “1” or “0” fag. Additionally, it was determined in
inspection and execution of the assessment tool that the value responsible for storing GPS
activation and GPS-authorized applications and services, “LOCATION PROVIDERS AL57

LOWED” found in the “Secure” table of the “Settings.db” database, were deprecated as
of Android API 19. All devices that possess Android API 20 and above instead use the
equivalent parameter “LOCATION MODE” to identify GPS activation and services with
granted access to GPS information [7].
A fnal mobile device, the Samsung Express 3, was purchased with the hope of gaining
root access for assessment tool testing and experimentation. The Samsung Express 3 possesses an Android OS build 6.0.1 known as “Marshmallow.” After many failed attempts to
root the device, it was determined that the service provider AT&T along with the manufacturer Samsung may prevent tampering or the establishment of “root” access by traditional
methods [44].
When running the program on additional mobile devices, it may be observed that most
features and storage locations remained the same despite warnings from [35] pertaining
to unique storage locations and property names associated with Samsung and the specifc
release of Android OS. This may still hold some truth, though additional testing over more
mobile platforms released by other manufacturers and with older and newer software builds
may be necessary to substantiate this claim. The only perceived difference was the alteration to two status fags that previously possessed binary values (i.e. “0”, “1”) and now
possess string values such as “null”.
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3.5

Application to Current Vulnerabilities
Using the current capabilities possessed by the asessment tool, it is quite easy to iden-

tify a myriad of potential vulnerabilities and open doors which malicious actors may leverage at a future date. For instance, the tool allows for proper identifcation of insecure
cell connections to the mobile service provider based on device or service provider preset
preferences. Additionally, unnecessarily maintained radios and improperly secured WiFi
confguration settings are also assessed and identifed as necessary. As [44] very clearly
point out, most attackers will use proximity attacks to gain leverage on a device as security precautions are not always taken, making unsuspecting or lazy users easy targets. WiFi
cracking software may crack a password in minutes if not properly secured, but with proper
addressing of this vulnerability a user may be capable of eliminating a potential weakness
in his mobile device security [44]. Through identifcation of open socket information, potentially vulnerable avenues of attack may be identifed and addressed, thereby making the
mobile device’s network attack surface smaller [9].
Other vulnerabilities addressed by the assessment tools include the many possible
weaknesses or oversights associated with applications. Excessive or powerful permissions
granted to individual applications can pose a serious threat if an application is somehow
later leveraged by a malicious actor. Applications wield the capability to do such things as
generate independent SMS messages, download content without user knowledge or explicit
consent, and even to make independent phone calls. These capabilities are all potential areas of concern, as can be seen in [13]. The assessment tool identifes such potential threats
through in-depth permissions granted, intent authorized, and individual or shared UID as
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identifed in [18]. By providing this information to the user, the individual may be better able to understand the extent of the potential attack surface and make the adjustments
necessary to mitigate future threats.
Finally, resource-layer threats and those associated with the system as a whole were
addressed as was pertinant to the overall state of security. The books [18] and [22] spoke
of the great importance of identifying proper policy and procedures. These sources also
spoke of the necessity for certain settings always to be enabled to ensure that no foreign
entities may act inappropriately or without notice and that there is proper accountability
for all native applications. While the Android OS platform and the Google Play Store help
to maintain a proper level of security, if a user does not limit and verify any apps that are
present on his device, or if the Java or Android API are no longer supported, it is quite
possible for malicious actors to gain a presence on the mobile device. The assessment tool
identifes such settings and relays to the user what vulnerabilities still exist pertaining to
accessible resources, device support, and critical security settings.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

4.1

Final Findings
The automated vulnerability assessment tool described in this thesis is a useful tool for

assessing the security of an Android mobile device. The Python program produces a detailed account of the overall state of the attack surface of a mobile device. This assessment
includes relevant information pertaining to how the device communicates, how applications interact, how resources are accessed by other entities on the device, and the overall
system security posture of the mobile device. These capabilities are only made possible
through extensive research of how a mobile device operates and the security internals the
Android Operating System. It was through the analysis of the mobile hacking methodology and forensics techniques that this program was developed. Using select automated
ADB commands, this program assesses the Communication, Application, and Resource
layers of an Android Mobile device, providing an extensive output assessment fle based
on a user’s input at run-time.
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4.2

Future Works

The automated mobile assessment program possesses three modules based on three
distinct layers as outlined in the paper [43]. There are certainly more approaches to mobile
device security that may be taken to supplement the mobile security assessment tool as well
as avenues where further research may be focused. Limitations in resources and the design
of the initially proposed assessment tool restrict the current capabilities of the product.
However, efforts may be made to enhance the application to provide more comprehensive
coverage. This suggests an application with further-reaching effects, one designed to accommodate more variants of mobile devices, with respect to both Android OS version,
Manufacturer, and specifc product releases.
For instance, the tool may be further developed to give the user more comprehensive
feedback ensuring longevity of the tool. By providing some web-based interaction with a
remote site such as [5] or access to a database with known mobile device vulnerabilities,
this may allow the assessment tool to determine future vulnerabilities not covered in the
current iteration of the product. These practices are similar to those covered by antivirus
providers, though in the case of [26] the vast number of undocumented mobile vulnerabilities may prove that the methods taken in the paper, [26], would be more benefcial as
each application is individually disassembled into equivalent source code, scanned for secure coding shortfalls, and either remedied or adequately documented in a newly-generated
archive.
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Another key focus area that still plagues mobile devices, the use of WebView in thirdparty or user-installed applications, continues to be authorized. The current state of the
automated assessment tool does not allow for deep-level inspection of source code for secure coding practices which require off-board disassembly. Furthermore, the tool does not
allow for internal function calls to native applications on the device as this would require
a more substantial onboard presence or the inclusion of a custom, Java-written application
with root privileges. Because this was beyond the scope of the original program design,
it is recommended as a possibility for future works. The inclusion of a custom onboard
program may allow for greater leverage in order to determine whether an application actually calls upon the WebView or WebKit Android Libraries. This capability may be expanded even further with the inclusion of other such vulnerabilities. Some variants of pure
disassembly and coding inspection have been attempted previously in [27] and [33], but
the latter-mentioned approach of performing function calls using IPC channels has lessobserved research efforts, so this may prove a good place to expand the capabilities of the
current vulnerability assessment tool.
The inclusion of a native application on the mobile device will allow for greater access to intent generation and interrogation of the “Content Provider” of other applications,
which may be vulnerable to attacks through the allowance of poor or unprotected Content
Provider protections and a fawed use of functions associated with API 16 and below. At
present, this may be covered with a simple test of the native API level of the mobile device
to determine if, generally, a program may be written that would hypothetically possess
security faws. However, with the inclusion of an on-board, Java-written application, in63

spection of each application may be accomplished. Using an onboard application, each
application may be tested to identify whether a specifc parameter, such as the “exported”
Content Provider parameter, is set to “true” and thereby vulnerable. Additionally, “broadcast intents” or other explicit actions may be taken on the part of the assessment individual
from within the Java-based environment in order to assess the security of IPC channels
between applications, a scenario only truly accomplished from an on-board application.
Other research, such as [37] confrms the possibility of data leakage from this source and
reaffrms the need to address this vulnerability more closely. The book [18] utilizes an
on-board presence to conduct SQL Injection attacks on a mobile device’s native SQLite
database, further demonstrating that a Java-aided component may allow for identifcation
of SQL-specifc vulnerabilities.
Utilizing MITRE’s CVE database [11] proved an effective frst step in identifying potential vulnerabilities that may exist at the frmware, kernel, and core operating system
levels. However, the CVE database does not possess vulnerability entry formatting that is
easily associated with a specifed device. Much data processing would be necessary for
proper vulnerability detection, and the lack of a query option based on specifc device and
poor syntax allows some vulnerabilities to go undetected. It is suggested that most of these
vulnerabilities are tracked by individual manufacturers and patch updates accommodate
for fortifying these security weaknesses. Further research, however, may prove helpful
to determine how security frms track mobile device-specifc vulnerabilities and whether
there may be a method to develop an independent database or integrate a frm-developed
database into future assessment tools.
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The inclusion of Mobile Service Provider Network identifcation may also prove to
account for individual connections more accurately. This capability would include the
ability to identify and address the aforementioned femto vulnerability common in mobile
networks, especially CDMA networks. This addition may allow for a more accurate identifcation of legacy cellular network connections with inferior security that may not ensure
mutual authentication between the BTS and the mobile device. In order to accommodate
this capability, the automation tool will also require the addition of an onboard presence on
the mobile device to ensure the ability to manipulate specifc aspects of the Android API.
The inclusion of this onboard presence would also be necessary to interact with the Telephony Manager Service, that is the service responsible for interfacing with the BTS and the
Mobile Subscriber Network. As it stands now, the device may only be able to identify the
current network properly. As may be seen in the open source product “FemtoCellCatcher,”
the third-party application, once installed on the Android mobile device, then looks only at
the mobile network to which it is currently connected. Only by including such an onboard
presence of an application may function calls such as GetCellularID() and GetCellID()
function calls be administered and allow the resulting string values to be captured and
properly parsed for the critical Network ID information. [44] informed the reader of the
need to identify this information in order to verify the last two hex characters that would
confrm a potential femto cell. Observing the open source code in the “FemtoCellCatcher”
confrms these claims [17].
The efforts made in the development of the assessment tool described in this thesis
make up only a portion of what may continue to be examined in the realm of mobile
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device security. This assessment tool is in no way a detection tool for every conceivable
“zero-day” or undiscovered vulnerability, nor is it a method of detection for identifying
malicious software and malicious activity. Instead, this automated assessment tool serves
as a proof of concept method for evaluating the potential attack surface of a mobile device
possessing an Android Operating System.
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